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INTRODUCTION
Landmark moments in patent law are rare. Henry VI can claim
the earliest of them in 1449 by granting letters patent for a new
method of making stained glass.1 Parliament stepped in nearly 200
years later, in 1624, when the Statute of Monopolies rendered all
monopolies illegal save for those granted for a term of fourteen
years for “working or making of any manner of new manufactures
within this Realm to the true and first inventor” (a principle that
*
Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, London.
** Barrister, 11 South Square, London.
1
See History of Patents, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, http://www.ipo.gov.uk/phistory.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
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remains in place to this day).2 Patents then were still granted by
royal prerogative and bore a royal command that was the basis for
adjudicating infringement. Parliament did not turn its attention to
infringement until the 1970s, when the United Kingdom joined the
European Common Market and the European Patents Convention
(the “EPC”), finally giving the UK system a wholly statutory
basis.3
The EPC’s primary purpose was to harmonize the principles of
patentability among the contracting states.4 A secondary purpose
was to create a central European Patent Office (the “EPO”).5 The
EPO would have the power to grant patents that would be
enforceable in their national territories—without any reference to
the national office and, uniquely, without the supervision of any
state court.6 To this extent, the EPC created a truly supranational
patent system.
The UK implemented the EPC through the Patents Act 1977
(the “1977 Act”).7 The 1977 Act describes itself in its preamble as
“a new law of patents.”8 Patent attorneys were immediately
coming to terms with the EPC in their dealings with Munich. But
domestically, the UK courts and those acting before them carried
on as if nothing material had changed, looking to the words of the
1977 Act and paying little regard to the underlying EPC. For the
next decade they tended to turn to pre-1977 case law as an aid to
interpretation, in preference to the developing case law of any
other EPC member states or the EPO. There were four related
reasons for this. First, patents granted under the new Act took time
to find their way into the courts. Secondly, the senior patent
2

Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.); see also History of Patents in
the
Tudors
and
Stuarts
Period,
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
OFFICE,
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/patent/p-about/p-whatis/p-history/p-history-tudor.htm (last
visited Sept. 21, 2012).
3
See History of Patents in the Twentieth Century, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE,
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/patent/p-about/p-whatis/p-history/p-history-20century.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
4
See Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention),
art. 1, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter EPC].
5
Id. art. 4, 1065 U.N.T.S. at 259.
6
See id. art. 2, 1065 U.N.T.S. at 259.
7
Patents Act, 1977, c. 37 (U.K.).
8
Id.
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lawyers of the day—the partners, QCs and judges—had all grown
up under the old law. Thirdly, much of the old law remained in
force for patents granted before the new Act came into force.
Fourthly, judges were simply not as used to European influence as
they are today.
In 1991 the status quo began to change as the first in a series of
important patent cases under the 1977 Act came before the UK’s
highest court, the House of Lords. In each, the court had to
grapple with the fundamental policy question at the heart of any
difficult patent case: did the patentee’s contribution to public
knowledge justify the monopoly it was claiming? For over 500
years the English courts had been used to resolving these questions
independently. In 1991 it became apparent they were no longer at
liberty to do so. Their duty was to interpret a new law of patents
which applied not only in the UK but throughout the continent.
While it was not yet certain what this new law meant, it was clear
that the contracting states intended that its application be uniform.
But, unable to supervise one another, how were the national courts
to achieve this uniformity? The practical answer, decided the
House of Lords, was the EPO.
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (formerly the
House of Lords) chooses the cases it will hear, and only hears
cases raising a point of law of general public importance.9 It has
heard only a handful of cases over the last twenty years. But those
cases are the most important precedent in UK law and, with
increasing clarity and insistence, as will be seen, they directed the
lower courts to treat the EPO as the de facto final arbiter of the
UK’s law of patents. Whether this development was intended or
even foreseen by the founding fathers of the EPC is unclear. But
with hindsight, it was probably inevitable.
The role of practitioners has reflected (and perhaps even led)
the internationalization of substantive law recognized in House of
9
The test is set out in paragraph 3.3.3 of the UK Supreme Court Practice direction 3:
“an arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by
the Supreme Court at that time, bearing in mind that the matter will already have been the
subject of judicial decision and may have already been reviewed on appeal.” Practice
Direction (Applications for Permissions to Appeal) (Supreme Court), [2012], para. 3.3.3,
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/practice-direction-03.pdf.
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Lords decisions. The chinks in UK defences to mainland
European and EPO case law that first showed up in the early 1990s
have gradually been opened.
This process will continue
inexorably, and with renewed vigour, as the final steps are taken to
implementing the new European patent “package”—the Unitary
Patent and Unified Patents Court.
This paper uses seven key Supreme Court/House of Lords
decisions to examine the growing influence of the EPO.10 It then
considers how the new European patents package will fit into the
delicate balance that has been achieved between national courts
and the EPO, and its likely effect on the development of Europe’s
law of patents. Finally, it looks at the way in which practice for
litigators has changed over the last two decades and what the
coming decades may hold.
I. 1991—ASAHI’S APPLICATION11
The essential issue in Asahi was whether a patentee is entitled
to a patent when his invention already forms part of the state of the
art, but is not yet enabled.12
In February 1985, Dainippon Pharmaceutical Company
Limited applied for a European Patent claiming human tumour
necrosis factor (or “HTNF”) (“Dainippon 2”).13 Dainippon 2
claimed priority from a Japanese application filed in March 1984
(“Dainippon 1”).14 In April 1985, Asahi filed an application for a
UK patent claiming HTNF (“Asahi 2”).15 Asahi 2 claimed priority
from a U.S. application filed in April 1984 (“Asahi 1”).16 It was
common ground that Dainippon 1 disclosed no way of actually
making HTNF, only its sequence, while the other three
applications did disclose a way of making HTNF.17
10

In this paper we refer to the EPO as a convenient general shorthand, but more
particularly we also refer to the decisions of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO.
11
Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. 485 (H.L.).
12
Id.
13
Id. at 505.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 500, 531.
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The examiner rejected Asahi 2 on the grounds that it lacked
novelty over Dainippon 2, which was in turn entitled to priority
from Dainippon 1.18 On appeal, the issue resolved into twin
questions: (i) whether, for Dainippon 1 to confer priority on
Dainippon 2, it was necessary for Dainippon 1 to constitute not
merely a disclosure but an enabling disclosure of HTNF; and (ii)
whether, to destroy the novelty of (or ‘anticipate’) Asahi 2,
Dainippon 2 also had to constitute not merely a disclosure but an
enabling disclosure of HTNF.19
The old English law on the point was unclear. In ICI/Pyridine
Herbicides, however, the EPO had decided that (1) a claim to a
chemical formula was not anticipated by the disclosure of that
formula in the prior art unless that disclosure was also enabling
and that (2) the test for whether a prior art disclosure was enabling
was the same as the test for sufficiency.20 In Collaborative
Research Inc/Preprorennin, the EPO held that the same test had to
be satisfied for the purpose of claiming priority, i.e. the priority
document had to be not merely a disclosure of the invention but an
enabling disclosure.21
In these cases the EPO had (standing back from the language
of the EPC) recognized that, if a claimed invention could be
anticipated by a mere disclosure which enabled nothing, there was
a risk that genuine contributions to public knowledge in the form
of enabling disclosures would not be rewarded.22 It followed
inexorably that, if a non-enabling disclosure should not itself be
novelty-destroying, the same disclosure should not be indirectly
novelty-destroying through the priority system.
The UK Patent Office, the Patents Court and the Court of
Appeal all rejected the EPO’s logic and decided the case against
Asahi on either old case law or by narrowly construing the 1977
Act.23 When the case reached the House of Lords, Lord Oliver
18

Id. at 531.
See id. at 535.
20
Id. at 551 (citing Case T-206/83, ICI/Pyridine Herbicides, 1987 O.J. E.P.O. 5).
21
Id. at 512 (citing Case T-81/87, Collaborative Research/Preprorennin, 1990 O.J.
E.P.O. 250).
22
See, e.g., id. at 513.
23
See id. at 486.
19
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(who gave the leading speech) took a very different approach. He
accepted Asahi’s argument, holding that UK law had arrived
independently at the conclusion that an enabling disclosure was
required for anticipation, and therefore priority, observing:
It should be added that the same approach as that
adopted by Falconer J. in the Genentech case has
been adopted in the [Pyrimidines and Preprorennin
cases] . . . . These decisions, as was pointed out by
Dillon L.J. in the instant case, are not binding in the
United Kingdom, but they must carry considerable
persuasive authority having regard to the provisions
of section 130(7) [which declares certain sections of
the 1977 Act to have same effect as equivalent
provisions of the EPC] and the desirability of
avoiding, so far as possible, divergent jurisprudence
on the interpretation of broadly parallel
provisions.24
Asahi had been the first to teach the world how to obtain
HTNF.25 It followed that it was entitled to a patent for this
contribution.26 The anticipated objection based on Dainippon 1
failed.
It is hard to fault the EPO’s reasoning in the Pyrimidines and
Preprorennin cases and it may therefore be unsurprising that Lord
Oliver agreed with it. But a precedent had now been set: although
EPO decisions were not binding on the UK courts, the courts were
nevertheless to treat those decisions as carrying “considerable
persuasive authority.”27
II. 1996—MERRELL DOW V. NORTON28
In Merrell Dow the essential issue was how much detail about
an invention a patentee needed to disclose to be entitled to a
patent.29
24
25
26
27
28

Id. at 540.
See id. at 500.
See id. at 542.
Id. at 540.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Norton & Co. Ltd., [1996] R.P.C. 76 (H.L.).
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In 1972, Merrell Dow obtained a patent for an antihistamine
called terfenadine.30 Having patented terfenadine, it discovered
that the active agent was in fact an acid metabolite of terfenadine
formed in the liver.31 In 1980, Merrell Dow obtained a patent for
the acid metabolite.32 When the terfenadine patent expired in
1992, Merrell Dow claimed it could continue to prevent
competitors selling terfenadine because to do so would be to
knowingly provide a “means essential” for producing the acid
metabolite.33 The question that came before the House of Lords
was whether the claim to the acid metabolite was anticipated by
either the original terfenadine specification (“anticipation by
disclosure”) or the administration of terfenadine to volunteers in
the clinical trials (“anticipation by use”).34
Lord Hoffmann gave the leading judgment. He started by
noting that the 1977 Act requires section 2, which deals with
anticipation, to be given the same effect as the corresponding
provision of the EPC, and observed:
It is therefore the duty of the United Kingdom
courts to construe section 2 so that, so far as
possible, it has the same effect as Article 54. For
this purpose, it must have regard to the decisions of
the European Patent Office (“EPO”) on the
construction of the EPC. These decisions are not
strictly binding upon courts in the United Kingdom
but they are of great persuasive authority; first,
because they are decisions of expert courts (the
Boards of Appeal and Enlarged Board of Appeal of
the EPO) involved daily in the administration of the
EPC and secondly, because it would be highly
undesirable for the provisions of the EPC to be
construed differently in the EPO from the way they

29
30
31
32
33
34

Id.
Id. at 80.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 81.
See id. at 82–84.
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are interpreted in the national courts of a
Contracting State.35
Lord Hoffmann’s first contribution in the House of Lords to the
UK’s law of patents was therefore to emphasize the EPO’s
authority in construing the EPC and, by extension, the 1977 Act.
His reasoning was quite explicit, as the emphasised passage
demonstrates. Consistency was the paramount concern.36
Lord Hoffmann dealt with the “anticipation by use” argument
first.37 Under the old law, there was no question that the
administration of terfenadine to volunteers in the clinical trials,
with the inevitable consequence of producing the acid metabolite
in their livers, would have anticipated the acid metabolite patent.38
It was clear that the acid metabolite had been produced before the
priority of the patent,39 whether anyone was aware of this or not,
and this would have been enough to make it part of the state of the
art.40 It was argued that the new law was no different.41
Lord Hoffmann disagreed:
I think that this argument . . . dissolves completely
when one looks, as one must, at Article 54 [the
definition of novelty in the EPC]. This provision
makes it clear that to be part of the state of the art,
the invention must have been made available to the
public. An invention is a piece of information.
Making matter available to the public within the
meaning of section 2(2) therefore requires the
communication of information. The use of a
product makes the invention part of the state of the
art only so far as that use makes available the
necessary information. 42
35

Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
See id.
37
See id. at 85.
38
See id.
39
See id. at 80.
40
See id. at 85.
41
See id. at 86.
42
Id. (second emphasis added). It may also be observed that, having characterized an
invention as “a piece of information,” it is hard to see how the “anticipation by use”
36
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In other words, whereas under the old law “uninformative use”
could anticipate a patent, under the new law it could not.
Next he turned to the “anticipation by disclosure” argument. It
was not suggested that the terfenadine patent made any specific
reference to the acid metabolite.43 All that was known at the time
was that terfenadine created some kind of chemical reaction in the
human body, which produced an antihistamine effect. To this
effect, the terfenadine specification contained the line: “a part of
the chemical reaction in the human body produced by the ingestion
of terfenadine and having an anti-histamine effect.”44
It was argued that for all practical purposes this was an
enabling disclosure of the acid metabolite.45 It was a description of
the essential characteristic of the metabolite, namely its antihistamine effect, and of how to make it and therefore the fact that
its precise chemical composition was not described was
immaterial.46 Merrell Dow countered that only disclosure of a
product by its chemical composition sufficed under the new law to
make a product part of the state of the art.47
Lord Hoffmann turned to EPO case law. He noted that, in
Bayer/Diastereomers, the EPO held that disclosure of a product
described as the product of a specified process makes the product
itself part of the state of the art whether or not its composition was
also disclosed.48 It followed, he reasoned, that the disclosure of the
chemical composition of a product is plainly not required to make
a product part of the state of the art.49 Lord Hoffmann then went
on to consider from first principles how much information about a
product was required to make it part of the state of the art.50 He
could have amounted to an enabling disclosure when the volunteers were not furnished
with adequate information (i.e. the fact that they were taking terfenadine) to go away and
continue to work the invention at will.
43
Id. at 87.
44
Id. at 90.
45
See id. at 88–89.
46
See id. at 86.
47
See id. at 89.
48
Id. at 89 (citing Case T-12/81, Diastereomers, 1982 O.J. E.P.O. 296). This is a socalled “product by process claim,” a theme to which we shall return.
49
See id. at 89–90.
50
See id. at 89.
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concluded that an invention forms “part of the state of the art if the
information which has been disclosed enables the public to know
the product under a description sufficient to work the invention.”51
The terfenadine patent enabled the public to know the acid
metabolite as part of the chemical reaction produced by ingesting
terfenadine.52 This was enough. He pithily summed up his
reasoning by observing that, in much the same way, quinine had
been part of the state of the art long before its chemical
composition was discovered by western scientists.53
At its core, Merrell Dow’s argument was that it deserved its
extended monopoly because it had revealed that terfenadine
worked because of the acid metabolite.54
Merrell Dow
acknowledged a striking consequence of this argument: if a
competitor had discovered the acid metabolite and patented it, that
competitor would have been entitled to prevent Merrell Dow
selling terfenadine.55 Instinctively, one feels this cannot be correct.
But why not? The answer is simple. Merrell Dow had already
taught the public that taking terfenadine produced an antihistamine
effect. The further discovery that this effect is actually produced
by the acid metabolite, while of academic interest, gave the public
no additional relevant knowledge.56
The fundamental question was therefore how much
information about an invention is sufficient to make that invention
part of the state of the art?57 The EPO’s approach to product by
process claims provided the answer.58 If the public has sufficient
information to obtain a product and know its practical application,
that is enough. A patentee need not teach any more than this, and a
patentee who does teach more than this is not entitled to a second

51

Id.
See id. at 90.
53
Id. at 91 (“The Amazonian Indian who treats himself with powdered bark for fever
is using quinine, even if he thinks the reason why the treatment is effective is that the tree
is favoured by the Gods.”).
54
See id. at 80–81.
55
See id.
56
See id.
57
See id. at 84–86.
58
Id. at 87.
52
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patent for the same product. As in Asahi, the touchstone was the
practical value of the disclosure to the public.59
Again, it is hard to fault the EPO’s reasoning in
Bayer/Diastereomers.60 No doubt this prompted Lord Hoffmann
not only to draw on that reasoning, but also to emphasize the
persuasive authority of the EPO’s decisions, thereby confirming
the Asahi precedent.
III. 1997—BIOGEN V. MEDEVA61
In Biogen, the essential question was not whether Biogen was
entitled to a monopoly at all, but how broad that monopoly should
be.62
Biogen, Inc. was set up in 1978 to exploit recombinant DNA
technology in the production of useful proteins.63 One initial target
was antigens of the Hepatitis B virus.64 Professor Sir Kenneth
Murray, a molecular biologist and one of Biogen’s founders, split
the then unsequenced HBV genome into large fragments, spliced
these into plasmid loops and introduced this recombinant DNA
into bacteria.65 His hope, but certainly not his expectation, was
that one of the fragments would contain a suitable HBV antigen
gene and that this would be “expressed” (i.e. translated into HBV
antigen protein) by the bacteria.66
The state of the art being what it was at the time, there was
much reason to doubt that Professor Murray’s approach would
work, but it did.67 Biogen immediately filed for patent protection,
first in the UK (Biogen 1), and later at the EPO (Biogen 2).68
Biogen 2, asserting priority from Biogen 1, claimed any
59

See id.; see also Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. 485 (H.L.).
Case T-12/81, Diasteromers, 1982 O.J. EPO 296.
61
Biogen v. Medeva, [1997] R.P.C. 1 (H.L.).
62
See id. at 4.
63
See id. at 33.
64
See id. (stating that these could be used to test for HBV infection and to develop a
vaccine).
65
See id. at 36–40.
66
See id. at 39.
67
See id. at 36–39.
68
Id. at 33.
60
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recombinant DNA molecule capable of expressing HBV
antigens.69
In due course Medeva found an entirely new way of producing
a recombinant HBV antigen. Biogen sued. In the House of Lords,
as in Asahi,70 the issue resolved into whether Biogen 1 enabled
Biogen 2.71 There was no question that the disclosure of Biogen 1
enabled the skilled addressee to make a recombinant DNA
molecule capable of expressing the HBV antigen.72 But equally
there was no suggestion that it enabled the skilled person to make
all such molecules.73
At first instance, the Patents Court held that an invention was
sufficiently enabled if the skilled man could make one embodiment
falling within the claim.74 Its reasoning was based on its
interpretation of the EPO’s decision in Genentech/Polypeptide
Expression.75
The Court of Appeal, however, reversed the Patents Court on
the question of sufficiency, pointing to the Exxon/Fuel oils case.76
In that case, the EPO had held that an invention must be enabled
across the full range of the claim, and whether or not this was so
was a question of fact in each case.77
The House of Lords agreed with the Court of Appeal.78 Lord
Hoffmann explained that the EPO’s decision in Genentech I had
been misinterpreted by the Patents Court:
[T]he Board in Genentech I/Polypeptide Expression
was doing no more than apply a principle of patent
law which has long been established in the United
Kingdom, namely, that the specification must
69

Id. at 40.
Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. 485 (H.L.).
71
See Biogen, [1997] R.P.C. at 46.
72
See id. at 48.
73
See id.
74
See id. at 49–50.
75
See id. (citing Case T-292/85, Genentech/Polypeptide expression, 1989 O.J. EPO
275).
76
See id. at 53–54 (citing Case T-409/91, Exxon/Fuel Oils, [1994] E.P.O.R. 149).
77
See Case T-409/91, Exxon/Fuel Oils, [1994] E.P.O.R. 149, 156.
78
See Biogen, [1997] R.P.C. at 53.
70
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enable the invention to be performed to the full
extent of the monopoly claimed. If the invention
discloses a principle capable of general application,
the claims may be in correspondingly general terms.
The patentee need not show that he has proved its
application in every individual instance. On the
other hand, if the claims include a number of
discrete methods or products, the patentee must
enable the invention to be performed in respect of
each of them.79
He went on to consider whether or not Biogen 1 disclosed a
principle of general application, which entitled it to the broad
monopoly claimed.80 In a now famous passage, he held that it did
not:
I return therefore to consider the technical
contribution to the art which Professor Murray
made in 1978 and disclosed in Biogen 1. As it
seems to me, it consisted in showing that despite the
uncertainties which then existed . . . known
recombinant techniques could nevertheless be used
to make the antigens in a prokaryotic host cell. . . .
Does this contribution justify a claim to a monopoly
of any recombinant method of making the antigens?
In my view it does not. The claimed invention is
too broad. Its excessive breadth is due, not to the
inability of the teaching to produce all the promised
results, but to the fact that the same results could be
produced by different means. . . . The metaphor
used by one of the witnesses was that before the
genome had been sequenced everyone was working
in the dark. Professor Murray invented a way of
working with the genome in the dark. But he did
not switch on the light and once the light was on his
method was no longer needed.81

79
80
81

Id. at 48.
Id. at 51–52.
Id.
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The fundamental question in Biogen was familiar: what
contribution had Biogen made to the art and how broad a
monopoly should it receive for that contribution? As we have
seen, the EPO—contrary to the Patents Court’s view—had held
that a broad claim had to be enabled across its full breadth, and that
whether that was so was a question of fact in each case.82 Lord
Hoffmann went further by reducing the EPO’s approach to a rule:
where the patentee had invented a “principle of general
application”—i.e. a principle which could be expected to work in
the same way whatever the precise details of the components or
reagents used—he was entitled to a broad claim.83 Lord Hoffman
found that Professor Murray had invented no such principle, and so
was not entitled to its broad claim.84
While Biogen showed the House of Lords seeking to follow
EPO case law, the consequence turned out to be a divergence
between UK and EPO case law. As we will explore below, the
House of Lords does not usually revisit the same ground in rapid
succession, but the difficulties created by Biogen brought the
sufficiency issue back before the Supreme Court in 2009.
IV. 2005—KIRIN-AMGEN V. HOECHST MARION ROUSSEL LTD.85
The formal issue in Kirin-Amgen was construction.86 Did
Amgen’s claim catch a rival product or did it not? Again,
however, the fundamental question was whether Amgen’s
contribution to the art entitled it to the broad monopoly claimed.87
By 1983, it was well known that the human kidney protein
Erythropoietin (“EPO”) was responsible for stimulating the
production of red blood cells in bone marrow.88 EPO’s potential as
a treatment for anaemia in patients with kidney disease was widely

82
83
84
85

See T-409/91, Exxon/Fuel Oils, [1994] E.P.O.R. 149, 156.
See Biogen, [1997] R.P.C. at 51.
See id.
Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] R.P.C.

9.
86
87
88

See id. at 184–87 [27–45].
See id. at 171 [H9].
See id. at 180 [8].
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recognized. Small amounts of the protein had been painstakingly
isolated and purified from human urine, but obtaining enough for
therapeutic use by this method was out of the question.89
Amgen was the first to sequence the gene for EPO.90 Equipped
with this sequence, it was able to isolate the gene from a human
donor cell and introduce it into a Chinese hamster cell in culture (a
“CHO cell”), which could then be used to produce large amounts
of EPO.91 Amgen filed a patent application claiming EPO
produced by the expression of recombinant DNA in a “host cell.”
A competitor, TKT, discovered a new way of using
recombinant DNA to produce EPO. Instead of extracting the gene
from a human cell and putting it into an animal cell, TKT used
recombinant DNA techniques to modify the EPO gene within a
human cell in culture so that it expressed large amounts of EPO.92
TKT called this technique “gene activation” and its product “GAEPO.”93 Amgen sued. The key question was whether Amgen’s
claim covered GA-EPO even though this had in fact been produced
in a modified human cell as opposed to a “host cell.”94
Section 125 of the 1977 Patent Act95 directed the Courts to
construe patent claims in accordance with Article 69 of the EPC
and the “Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69” (the
“Protocol”). Article 69 provides:
The extent of the protection conferred by a
European patent or a European patent application
shall be determined by the claims. Nevertheless,
the description and drawings shall be used to
interpret the claims.96
The Protocol then explains how Article 69 itself should be
interpreted:

89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at 179 [5].
Id. at 179–80 [6].
Id. at 180 [9].
Id. at 180–81 [10].
Id.
See id. at 179 [2].
The Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 125 (Eng.).
EPC, supra note 4, art. 69.
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Article 69 should not be interpreted as meaning that
the extent of the protection conferred by a European
patent is to be understood as that defined by the
strict, literal meaning of the wording used in the
claims, the description and drawings being
employed only for the purpose of resolving an
ambiguity found in the claims. Nor should it be
taken to mean that the claims serve only as a
guideline and that the actual protection conferred
may extend to what, from a consideration of the
description and drawings by a person skilled in the
art, the patent proprietor has contemplated. On the
contrary, it is to be interpreted as defining a position
between these extremes which combines a fair
protection for the patent proprietor with a
reasonable degree of legal certainty for third
parties.97
The Protocol represented perhaps the most striking
compromise between the signatories to the EPC, particularly the
UK and Germany. The UK and Germany were generally taken to
represent the extreme ends of construction, with their respective
approaches caricatured as a strictly literal approach to claim
construction on the one hand and a very loose approach to claim
construction on the other.98 The purpose of the Protocol was to
make clear that, under the new law, the courts of the contracting
states were to strike a balance between these two extremes.99
Following the entry into force of the 1977 Act, the Patents
Court decided that the Protocol simply reflected the traditional UK

97

European Patent Convention, Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69, art. 1,
Nov. 29, 2000, available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2010/e/
ma2a.html.
98
See, e.g., Thomas K. McBride, Jr., Patent Practice in London—Local
Internationalism: How Patent Law Magnifies the Relationship of the United Kingdom
with Europe, the United States, and the Rest of the World, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L. L. REV.
31, 40–43 (2005).
99
See Kirin-Amgen, [2005] R.P.C. at 183–84 [23–26]; Auchincloss v. Agricultural and
Veterinary Supplies, [1997] R.P.C. 649, 663.
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approach to construing patent claims.100 As we shall see, this was
to prove controversial. Some knowledge of the controversy as it
unfolded is necessary to understand Kirin-Amgen.
The old approach to claim construction had been settled in
Catnic v. Hill & Smith.101 The correct approach, as explained by
Lord Diplock, was “purposive construction:”
A patent specification should be given a purposive
construction rather than a purely literal one derived
from applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal
analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by
their training to indulge. The question in each case
is: whether persons with practical knowledge and
experience of the kind of work in which the
invention was intended to be used, would
understand that strict compliance with a particular
descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was
intended by the patentee to be an essential
requirement of the invention so that any variant
would fall outside the monopoly claimed, even
though it could have no material effect upon the
way the invention worked. . . . [The question] is to
be answered in the negative only when it would be
apparent to any reader skilled in the art that a
particular descriptive word or phrase used in a claim
cannot have been intended by a patentee, who was
also skilled in the art, to exclude minor variants
which, to the knowledge of both him and the
readers to whom the patent was addressed, could
have no material effect upon the way in which the
invention worked.102
The Catnic approach was applied under the 1977 Act in
Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd.103 The case
100
See, e.g., A.C. Edwards Ltd. v. Acme Signs & Displays Ltd., [1992] R.P.C. 131,
136; Southco Inc. v. Dzus Fastener Europe Ltd., [1992] R.P.C. 299, 312; Improver Corp.
v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., [1990] F.S.R. 181, 190.
101
Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 183, 242–43 (H.L.).
102
Id.
103
Improver, [1990] F.S.R. 181, 188–90.
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concerned a hair removal device called a depilator.104 The
functional part of Improver’s patented original device consisted of
a rotating, curved spring.105 Hairs entered into the space between
the coils of the spring on the convex side, and were gripped and
removed as the rotating coils were pressed together on the concave
side.106 Remington liked the basic idea. It noted that Improver’s
claim specified the use of a “helical spring” and proceeded to
design around the claim, replacing the helical spring with a
rotating, curved rubber rod scored with transverse slits.107 At trial,
the key question Judge Hoffmann108 had to answer was whether,
on its true construction, Improver’s claim caught Remington’s
product.109 He distilled Lord Diplock’s guidance on variants in
Catnic into three questions, the Improver or “Protocol” questions,
as follows:
(1) Does the variant have a material effect upon the
way the invention works? If yes, the variant is
outside the claim. If no—
(2) Would this (i.e. that the variant had no material
effect) have been obvious at the date of publication
of the patent to a reader skilled in the art. If no, the
variant is outside the claim. If yes—
(3) Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless
have understood from the language of the claim that
the patentee intended that strict compliance with the
primary meaning was an essential requirement of
the invention. If yes, the variant is outside the
claim.110
To the first two questions Hoffmann J. answered “no” and
“yes” respectively, leaving only the third. As to this, Improver
relied strongly on this passage in the specification:
104

See id. at 184 (“Depilation means the removal of hair by the root, as opposed to
shaving which leaves the root behind.”).
105
See id. at 184–85.
106
See id.
107
See id. at 187.
108
Lord Hoffmann was elevated to the Court of Appeal in 1992 and to the House of
Lords in 1995.
109
See Improver, [1990] F.S.R. at 188–89.
110
See id. at 189.
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It will be evident to those skilled in the art . . . that
the present invention may be embodied in other
specific forms without departing from the essential
attributes thereof . . . and all variations which come
within the meaning and range of equivalency of the
claims are therefore intended to be embraced
therein.111
The specification’s language notwithstanding, Judge Hoffmann
felt unable to give the term “helical spring” a wide, generic
construction and thus held the patent not infringed.112 Helical
spring meant helical spring. He noted that his opinion differed
from German courts’ result, despite the fact that both English and
German courts had purported to apply Article 69 and the Protocol,
but at the same time Hoffman J. did not fail to note that he
considered the German construction the result of an insufficiently
literal approach to construction.113
As noted in PLG v. Ardon, the German Oberlandesgericht, or
higher regional court, retaliated by criticizing Hoffmann J.’s
Improver opinion for applying a UK pre-1977 approach to
construction.114 The Ardon court went on to comment on the
inconsistent results:
[It is] unnecessary to consider whether Lord
Diplock’s purposive construction was an accurate if
proleptic application of the Protocol. It clearly went
at least part of the way towards the European
position by stretching the claims to cover minor
variants which obviously have no material effect on
the way the invention works. It does not, however,
appear to us to be useful to consider whether it went
further and may be taken as indicating the proper
approach to construction under the Protocol. Such
an exercise merely engenders a sterile debate on the
precise meaning of Lord Diplock’s words, a matter
111

Id. at 186.
Id. at 197.
113
See id. at 197–98.
114
See PLG Research Ltd. v. Ardon Int’l Ltd., [1995] R.P.C. 287, 307–09 (citing
Improver Corp. v. Remington Prods. Inc. [1991] IIC 833 (Ger.)).
112
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which should now be left to legal historians. Lord
Diplock was expounding the common law to the
construction of a patent. This has been replaced by
the approach laid down by the Protocol. If the two
approaches are the same, reference to Lord
Diplock’s formulation is unnecessary, while if they
are different it is dangerous. In future, it is to be
hoped that attention will be concentrated on the
requirements of the Protocol and the developing
European jurisprudence and not on those of the
common law before 1977.115
The Court of Appeal’s attempt to consign Catnic to legal
history was met with rebellion. In AssiDoman Multipack v. The
Mead Corporation, the specialist Patents Court Judge Aldous
retorted:
In that part of their judgment, the Court of Appeal
are, I believe, making it clear that their observation
on the applicability of “purposive” construction
under the 1977 Act are obiter. For myself, I would
be loathe to discard 14 years of case law unless it is
certain that the “purposive” construction is not the
correct approach under the Act. If it be right that
“purposive” construction should be left to legal
historians, then it is necessary to put forward
another means of navigation to enable the court to
steer the correct course between Scylla and
Charybdis. The middle ground referred to in the
Protocol is not clearly defined and every court
within the Community has adopted a method of
interpretation which it believes to be consistent with
the Protocol. . . . There is no European position
except that set out in the Protocol.116
Then, in Beloit Technologies Inc. v. Valmet Paper Machinery
Inc. (No. 2), the other senior Patents Court Judge, Jacob J.,

115
116

Ardon, [1995] R.P.C. at 309.
AssiDoman Multipack Ltd. v. Mead Corp., [1995] R.P.C. 321, 337.
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agreed.117 When the question came back before the Court of
Appeal, the newly elevated Aldous L.J. affirmed his view in
AssiDoman.118 “Purposive construction” was to remain the
English approach to claims construction, however it was done
elsewhere in Europe.
In Kirin-Amgen, therefore, Catnic remained the law. The judge
at first instance had initially reasoned that the skilled person would
not understand Amgen’s claim as covering GA-EPO.119 GA-EPO
was not made in a “host cell.” However, that judge then went on
to ask the Improver questions and decided that the claim did cover
GA-EPO after all.120
In the House of Lords, Lord Hoffmann reviewed the authorities
on construction and confirmed that “purposive construction” was
indeed compliant with the Protocol:
The Catnic principle of construction is, therefore, in
my opinion, precisely in accordance with the
Protocol. It is intended to give the patentee the full
extent, but not more than the full extent, of the
monopoly which a reasonable person skilled in the
art, reading the claims in context, would think he
was intending to claim.121
Turning to the controversy caused by his decision in the
Improver case, Lord Hoffman observed that ultimately there was
only one “compulsory” question: what would the skilled person,
reading the claims in context, think the patentee was intending to
Sometimes the Improver questions would help,
claim?122
sometimes they would not. But they were certainly not mandatory
in all cases involving allegedly immaterial variants.123 Lord
Hoffman held that the judge’s initial construction of the claim was
correct and that he had simply confused matters by attempting to
117

Beloit Techs. Inc. v. Valmet Paper Mach. Inc., [1995] R.P.C. 705, 719–21.
See Kaster v. Rizla Ltd., [1995] R.P.C. 585, 594 (“I have not been persuaded . . .
that the views I expressed in Assi[D]oman were wrong.”).
119
See Kirin-Amgen, [2005] R.P.C. at 192 [58].
120
See id. at 193–95 [63–75].
121
Id. at 189 [48].
122
Id. at 194 [69].
123
See id.
118
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apply the Protocol questions as well.124 There is a hint of
compromise in the judgment. Purposive construction was the
correct approach, but any attempt to define it further was liable to
lead to difficulties. Lord Hoffman used the opportunity to further
align the approach between European Courts, stating that:
German judges do not ask whether a variant “works
in the same way” but whether it solves the problem
underlying the invention by means which have the
same technical effect. That may be a better way of
putting the question because it avoids the ambiguity
illustrated by American Home Products Corporation
v Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd [2001] RPC 8
over whether “works in the same way” involves an
assumption that it works at all.125
Lord Hoffmann also held the various claims at issue bad either
for lack of novelty or for claims breadth insufficiency. In his
judgment’s final passage he observed:
Standing back from the detail, it is clear that Amgen
have got themselves into difficulties because,
having invented a perfectly good and groundbreaking process for making EPO and its analogues,
they were determined to try to patent the protein
itself, notwithstanding that, even when isolated, it
was not new.126
Elsewhere in the judgment, when addressing novelty, Lord
Hoffmann emphasized again the increasingly recognized
supremacy of EPO case law, and indeed he based his decision on
that principle:
I think it is important that the United Kingdom
should apply the same law as the EPO and the other
Member States when deciding what counts as new
for the purposes of the EPC. It is true that this
means a change in a practice which has existed for
many years. But the difference is unlikely to be of
124
125
126

See id.
Id. at 195 [75].
Id. at 206 [132].
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great practical importance because a patentee can
rely instead on the process claim and art. 64(2). It
would be most unfortunate if we were to uphold the
validity of a patent which would on identical facts
have been revoked in opposition proceedings in the
EPO. I would therefore allow this part of the
appeal.127
Again, the fundamental problem was that Amgen had tried to
claim more than was justified by their contribution to public
knowledge. And again, the House of Lords took the opportunity to
emphasize the importance of alignment between European Courts
and the supremacy of EPO case law.
V. 2008—CONOR MEDSYSTEMS V. ANGIOTECH PHARMACEUTICALS128
At issue in Angiotech was what exactly the patentee had
established at the time of filing about the usefulness and
obviousness of its claimed invention.129 The courts at first instance
had found that the patentee had in fact disclosed something useful,
but without an investigative basis for that disclosure.130
By the early 1990s, the value of stents for treating constricted
arteries was well known. However, the presence of a stent often
prompted an exaggerated healing response, causing the artery to
become constricted again.131
This process was known as
132
“restenosis.”
In 1993, a group of Dutch scientists published a
two-part article133 that reviewed the research that had been done
on restenosis, and the two prevailing theories for how it might
127
128

Id. at 200 [101] (citation omitted).
Conor Medsystems Inc. v. Angiotech Pharm. Inc., [2008] UKHL 49, [2008] R.P.C.

28.
129

Angiotech, [2008] R.P.C. at 722–23.
See id. at 725–26.
131
See id. at 721.
132
Id.
133
Id. (citing Jean-Paul R. Herrman et al., Pharmacological Approaches to the
Prevention of Restenosis Following Angioplasty: The Search for the Holy Grail? (Part I),
46 DRUGS 18 (1993); Jean-Paul R. Herrman et al., Pharmacological Approaches to the
Prevention of Restenosis Following Angioplasty: The Search for the Holy Grail? (Part
II), 46 DRUGS 249 (1993)).
130
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eventually be tackled.134 The first theory likened the phenomenon
to cancer and suggested the use of anti-proliferatives.135 The
second likened the process to clotting, and suggested the use of
anti-thromobotics.136
In a summary dealing with future
possibilities, the authors said:
[D]espite 15 years of clinical experience and
research in the field of restenosis prevention, this
has not yet resulted in the revelation of unequivocal
beneficial effects of any particular drug. . . .
Whether there is a feasible monotherapy, whether
we have to focus on a drug combination, or whether
we are only searching for the “Holy Grail” remains
to be answered.137
In short, then, in 1993, nobody knew precisely how to solve the
problem of restenosis—although there was no shortage of ideas.
Back in 1991, however, it had occurred to a medical student
called William Hunter that one way of dealing with restenosis
might be to seek to inhibit the growth of capillary blood vessels to
the affected area.138 He tested various drugs for anti-angiogenic
properties by an established, if somewhat crude, assay involving
chick embryos (the “CAM” assay).139 Among the drugs tested in
February 1993 was taxol, a recently discovered anti-proliferative
which was much in the news as a possible cancer treatment.140 On
the CAM assay, taxol was an extraordinarily effective inhibitor of
angiogenesis, “even in minute concentrations.”141
Angiotech immediately filed for a patent.142 The relevant
claim was for a stent coated with taxol for treating a “narrowing of

134

See Angiotech, [2009] R.P.C. at 721.
See id.
136
See id.
137
Id. (quoting Jean-Paul R. Herrman et al., Pharmacological Approaches to the
Prevention of Restenosis Following Angioplasty: The Search for the Holy Grail? (Part
II), 46 DRUGS 249 (1993)).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 722.
141
Id.
142
See id.
135
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a body passageway” and for “treating or preventing restenosis.”143
The application offered no proof that such a stent would work.144
In fact, all Angiotech had done was to decide to investigate antiangiogenesis as a possible way of dealing with restenosis,
identifying taxol as a promising anti-angiogenic.145
In 2005 Conor Medsystems applied to revoke the patent on the
grounds of obviousness.146
Conor argued that, because
Angiotech’s patent taught no more than that a taxol eluting stent
was worth a try in the battle against restenosis, all Conor had to
show was that it was obvious to try a taxol-coated stent.147 This,
Conor said, was obvious because it was obvious to try antiproliferatives and taxol was an anti-proliferative much in vogue.148
Angiotech countered that Conor’s approach was wrong in
principle. What Conor had to show, it argued, was that it was
obvious to use a taxol-coated stent to treat restenosis.149 This, said
Angiotech, was not obvious because there was no reason to think
that taxol, out of all the other anti-proliferatives that might have
been chosen, would actually work.150
The Patents Court and the Court of Appeal sided with Conor
and held the patent invalid for obviousness.151 In the Netherlands,
however, the same obviousness attack had failed.152 By the time
the matter came before the House of Lords, Angiotech and Conor
had settled their dispute.153 The House of Lords took the case in an
evident desire to resolve the tension between the results in the UK
and Holland.154 Having settled, Conor did not argue the case in the

143

Id.
Id. at 723.
145
See id. at 722.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 723 (quoting statement of Simon Thorley, Q.C.).
148
Id.
149
See id. (“That seemed a fairly straightforward issue and Angiotech no doubt
prepared for trial clutching the Holy Grail paper as the best possible evidence that there
was at the time no obvious solution to restenosis.”).
150
See id.
151
Id. at 720.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
See id.
144
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House of Lords; Angiotech’s opponent was the Comptroller of
Patents.155
The Comptroller’s case was based on a line of EPO authority
in which the EPO had interpreted the EPC as enabling it to reject
entirely speculative claims on the basis that they involved no
inventive step.156 The EPO took the view that, because the
patentee had not actually solved an objective technical problem,
the inventive step question simply did not arise.157 It addressed the
point at which a claim would become purely speculative in Johns
Hopkins University School of Medicine Case/Growth
Differentiation factor-9:
The definition of an invention as being a
contribution to the art, i.e. as solving a technical
problem and not merely putting forward one,
requires that it is at least made plausible by the
disclosure in the application that its teaching solves
indeed the problem it purports to solve.158
Lord Hoffmann took this “plausibility” requirement as the
guiding principle in the Angiotech case:
These cases are in my opinion far from the facts of
this case. The specification did claim that a taxol
coated stent would prevent restenosis and Conor did
not suggest that this claim was not plausible. That
would have been inconsistent with the evidence of
its experts that taxol was just the thing to try. It is
therefore not surprising that implausibility was
neither pleaded nor argued. The same was true of
the proceedings in the Netherlands. . . . [T]here is in
my opinion no reason as a matter of principle why,
if a specification passes the threshold test of
155

Id.
Id. at 727 (“There is also a line of authority in the EPO in which claims to broad
classes of chemical compounds alleged to have some common technical effect have been
rejected under [article] 56 (obviousness) when there was nothing to show they would all
have that technical effect.”).
157
See id. at 727–28.
158
Case
T-1329/04,
Factor-9/Johns
Hopkins,
¶
11,
available
at
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t041329eu1.pdf.
156
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disclosing enough to make the invention plausible,
the question of obviousness should be subject to a
different test according to the amount of evidence
which the patentee presents to justify a conclusion
that his patent will work.159
Accordingly, like the Dutch, the House of Lords held the patent
valid.160 The formal dispute had centered on whether the inventive
step question was to be considered by reference to the material
claimed, or to some combination of the claims and the
description.161 Underlying this formal question was the same
fundamental issue: had Angiotech actually given enough to justify
its claimed monopoly? The experienced judges of the Patents
Court and the Court of Appeal did not consider the CAM assay
results enough.162 The Dutch disagreed.163 Rightly or wrongly,
the House of Lords sided with the Dutch, citing the EPO’s
“plausibility” test as the relevant threshold.164 It held that the
CAM assay results were enough to make the invention “plausible,”
and that this was enough to justify Angiotech’s monopoly.165
It was far from clear that the Dutch and the EPO had got it
right. In Johns Hopkins, the EPO was surely correct to say that a
claim will be obvious if the specification does not even make it
plausible that the claimed invention actually works. But, all other
things being equal, is the converse necessarily true? The lower
courts took the view that the question of obviousness was, like
claims breadth sufficiency, ultimately to be decided by reference to
an inventor’s contribution to the art—to substance rather than
form.166 In the interest of maintaining consistency with both
another major European nation and the EPO, the House of Lords
decided that form took precedence so long as the invention was
merely “plausible.” This was a major victory for patentees. But

159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Angiotech, [2009] R.P.C. at 728.
See id. at 726.
See id. at 723.
See id. at 729.
Id.
See id. at 728.
See id. at 729–30.
Id. at 732 (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, concurring).
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given the assessment that the case would have gone the other way
in the absence of a desire to be seen to be following EPO case law,
the decision served as the clearest indicator to date of the deference
that the House of Lords was now paying to EPO case law.
VI. 2009—GENERICS (UK) LTD. V. LUNDBECK167
Lundbeck returned to the question posed in Biogen: whether
the patentee had invented a “principle of general application” so as
to justify a broad claim. The outcome was both surprising and
controversial.
In 1989, citalopram entered the market for antidepressants.168
It had been discovered and patented by Lundbeck.169 The process
for synthesising citalopram produced a racemate, i.e., an
undifferentiated mixture of two alternative three-dimensional
forms or “enantiomers” of the same molecule.170 Nobody knew
how to “resolve” the racemate, i.e., how to produce each of the
enantiomers in its pure form,171 and nobody knew whether
citalopram’s pharmacological effect was attributable to one or the
other of the enantiomers or to both.172
In 1987, Lundbeck succeeded in resolving the racemate.173 It
discovered that the anti-depressant effect was caused entirely by
the (+)-enantiomer, escitalopram.174 Lundbeck filed a patent for
escitalopram.175 Claim 1 of the patent was to escitalopram defined
by its chemical formula.176 Claim 6 of the patent was to
Lundbeck’s method of producing escitalopram.177

167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Generics (UK) Ltd. v. H Lundbeck A/S, [2009] UKHL 12, [2009] R.P.C. 13.
[2009] R.P.C. at 428 [59].
Id.
Id. at 414 [2].
Id. at 428–29 [61].
Id.
Id. at 429 [62].
Id.
Id.
Id. at 414 [5].
Id.
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In 2005, Generics applied to revoke the escitalopram patent.178
It argued that all Lundbeck had done was to repatent the active
ingredient in citalopram; that the way Lundbeck had succeeded in
resolving the racemate was obvious; and that Lundbeck’s real
contribution to the art was to find one way of resolving the
racemate, yet it sought to claim escitalopram made by any method
per Biogen and Kirin-Amgen.179
The judge at first instance rejected the novelty and obviousness
attacks, but accepted that the patent was insufficient by virtue of
claims that were too broad.180 That left Lundbeck with only a
claim to its specific method of producing escitalopram. Lundbeck
appealed. Exceptionally, Lord Hoffmann descended from the
House of Lords to sit in the Court of Appeal, giving him the
opportunity to revisit and explain the principle he had laid down in
Biogen.181
First, Lord Hoffmann rejected the novelty attack on the
strength of EPO case law on the disclosure (or, rather, nondisclosure) of enantiomers by racemates,182 and the obviousness
attack on the facts.183 On sufficiency, he said this:
S.60(1) of the Act makes it clear that a claim may
be either to a product or a process. In the case of a
product claim, performing the invention for the
purposes of s.72(1)(c) means making or otherwise
obtaining the product. In the case of a process
claim, it means working the process. A product
claim is therefore sufficiently enabled if the
specification discloses how to make it. There is
nothing to say that it must disclose more than one
way. The judge founded his decision entirely upon
the decision of the House of Lords in Biogen Inc v.
Medeva plc [1997] R.P.C. 1, which he subjected to
a careful and detailed analysis. I shall try, with
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id. at 429 [65].
See Generics (UK) Ltd. v. Lundbeck, [2007] R.P.C. 32, 737 [4].
See id. at 795 [266].
See Lundbeck v. Generics (UK) Ltd., [2008] R.P.C. 19.
Id. at 443 [9].
Id. at 446 [25].
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suitable diffidence to explain why I do not think
that case yields so broad a principle. 184
Lord Hoffmann explained that Biogen was decided as it was
because it involved not a product claim, but a “product-byprocess” claim.185 By defining the product by the way in which it
had been made, namely by recombinant DNA technology, the
claim had inherently claimed a class of products, because the word
“recombinant” encompassed a class of processes.186 Pure product
claims, he said, were different:
[The judge] treated the relevant “technical
contribution to the art” as being the inventive step,
namely a way of making the enantiomer. That, I
respectfully consider, was a mistake. When a
product claim satisfies the requirements of s.1 of the
1977 Act, the technical contribution to the art is the
product and not the process by which it was made,
even if that process was the only inventive step.
That proposition is in my opinion established by a
number of decisions in the European Patent Office.
In T0595/90 Kawasaki Steel Corporation [1994]
O.J. E.P.O. 695 claim 1 was to a product, namely a
certain description of high grade steel sheeting. In
opposition proceedings, the Board of Appeal found
that the claimed product “only has properties which
were fully predicted and envisaged, i.e. the matter is
obvious as such.” However, the Board went on,
“this desideratum was not yet actually achieved”
and was “hardly realisable on a commercial scale.”
If the patentee had found a non-obvious way of
making the product, he was entitled to a product

184

Id. at 447 [30–31] (citation omitted).
See id.at 447 [33]. Lord Hoffman had disapproved of such claims in Kirin-Amgen.
See Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] R.P.C.
9, 198 [90] (H.L.).
186
See Lundbeck, [2008] R.P.C. 19 at 448 [34].
185
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claim, with the full monopoly of the product which
that conferred.187
He went on to describe a number of other EPO authorities to
the same effect and concluded:
Biogen should therefore not be read as casting any
doubt upon the proposition that an inventor who
finds a way to make a new product is entitled to
make a product claim, even if its properties could
have been fully specified in advance and the
desirability of making it was obvious.188
Lundbeck’s product claim was therefore valid.189 Lord
Hoffmann’s judgment was upheld on the further appeal to the
House of Lords.190
It is far from clear that the EPO got it right in Kawasaki Steel
and the other product claim cases. As Lord Hoffmann observed, it
had not even occurred to anyone that sufficiency should even be
argued in these cases.191 But this does not necessarily mean that it
would not have been a good point, as it was in Biogen. The
tension between the result in the two cases is obvious. Lord
Hoffmann himself recognised as much.192 He suggested that,
ultimately, Biogen had been unfortunate because it could not make
a pure product claim.193 A DNA molecule which expressed HBV
antigens was known to exist in nature, had been isolated in the
form of the HBV genome and was therefore old.194 This reasoning
is unconvincing. What Professor Murray had made was clearly not
the same as the HBV genome. Assuming, then, that Biogen could
have found a way to describe Professor Murray’s DNA molecule
that did not use the word “recombinant,” it appears to follow that
Biogen would have been entitled to their broad monopoly after all.

187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

Id. at 448 [36–37].
Id. at 449 [40].
Id. at 450 [47].
See Generics (UK) Ltd. v. Lundbeck, [2009] UKHL 12, [2009] R.P.C. 13.
See [2009] R.P.C. at 446–50 [26–47].
See id. at 449 [42].
See id.
See Biogen, [1997] R.P.C. at 26.
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Yet its actual contribution to the art would have remained the
same.
Like Angiotech, then, Lundbeck was a triumph of form over
substance designed to ensure consistency with the EPO. “Great
persuasive authority” meant exactly what it said.
VII. 2011—HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES V. ELI LILLY195
In Human Genome Sciences v. Eli Lilly the issue was very
similar to the issue in Angiotech save that the attack was industrial
applicability rather than obviousness.
In 1996, Human Genome Sciences discovered a DNA
sequence which coded for a member of the “TNF ligand
superfamily” of proteins.196 TNF ligands are proteins which act as
intercellular mediators in inflammation and other immune
responses.197
HGS called its new member of the family
198
“neutrokine-α.”
It had discovered neutrokine-α not by any
laboratory technique, but by mining publicly available databases of
human DNA sequence information using information technology
techniques called “bioinformatics.”199
HGS applied to patent neutrokine-α.200 The description
essentially disclosed the sequence and structure of neutrokine-α, its
tissue distribution and a prediction of its properties based on the
general properties of the TNF ligand superfamily.201 However,
none of this was backed up with any specific information about
neutrokine-α derived from any in vivo or in vitro experiments.202 It

195

Human Genome Sciences, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., [2011] UKSC 51, [2012] R.P.C.

6.

196

Id., [2012] R.P.C. at 109 [3]. The reader will recall that TNF itself was the subject
of the applications in the Asahi case. See Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s Application, [1991]
R.P.C. 485 (H.L.).
197
Eli Lilly, [2012] R.P.C. at 110 [7].
198
Id. at 109 [3].
199
Id. at 112 [17].
200
Id. at 109 [4].
201
Id. at 110 [7–8].
202
Id.
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couldn’t be—the experiments had not yet been done and the
specific information was not yet available.203
Eli Lilly applied to revoke the patent, arguing that HGS’s
“invention” was so speculative it was not capable of industrial
application.204 Lilly was successful before the examiners at the
EPO and at first instance in the UK.205 However, by the time the
case came before the Court of Appeal in the UK, HGS had
successfully appealed to the Technical Board of Appeal of the
EPO.206 In summary, the Board held that the skilled person would
have appreciated “in the light of common general knowledge of the
TNF ligand superfamily and its properties” that neutrokine-α
would be active in directing the proliferation, differentiation and
migration of T-cells and that this was enough to justify a
monopoly.207
The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that it need not give
deference to the TBA on what it considered findings of fact and
that the judge had been correct in law and fact.208 It was an overt
rejection of an EPO decision. In 2011, the matter came on before
the newly formed Supreme Court.209 Giving the leading judgment,
Lord Neuberger observed:
In a number of recent decisions of the House of
Lords, attention has been drawn to “the importance
of UK patent law aligning itself, so far as possible,
with the jurisprudence of the EPO (and especially
decisions of its Enlarged Boards of Appeal)”, to
quote Lord Walker in Generics (UK) Ltd v. H
Lundbeck A/S, [2009] R.P.C. 13, para.35. It is
encouraging that the same approach is being
adopted in Germany by the Bundesgerichtshof—see

203

Id.
Id. at 114 [29].
205
Id.
206
Id. at 114 [30].
207
Id.
208
Id. at 115 [32].
209
The House of Lords ended its judicial function on 30 July 2009; the Supreme Court
opened on 1 October 2009.
204
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Case Xa ZR 130/07 (10 September 2009), para.
33.210
He went on to point out that, while it was permissible for
national courts to differ from each other and the EPO where the
evidence in the various proceedings was different, and that there
was “room for dialogue” between the national courts and the EPO,
where the EPO had adopted a consistent approach to an issue in a
number of decisions, the national courts should follow that
approach.211 This, he held, was the position with the EPO’s
approach to industrial applicability.212
In view of the differing results between the result in the EPO
on the one hand, and the result at first instance and in the Court of
Appeal on the other, it was perhaps inevitable that the Supreme
Court would hold that the courts below had failed properly to
apply the principles developed by the EPO.213 Lord Neuberger
interpreted the EPO jurisprudence as meaning that a “plausible” or
“reasonably credible” claimed use for an invention, or an
“educated guess,” would suffice to satisfy the requirement of
industrial applicability.214 He held that the judge and the Court of
Appeal had erred in applying a more stringent test, and finally
observed:
Just as it would be undesirable to let someone have
a monopoly over a particular biological molecule
too early, because it risks closing down
competition, so it would be wrong to set the hurdle
for patentability too high . . . . Quite where the line
should be drawn in the light of commercial reality
and the public interest can no doubt be a matter of
different opinions and debate.215
As in Angiotech, the UK Patents Court and the Court of Appeal
had decided that the validity of a patent had to be decided by

210
211
212
213
214
215

Eli Lilly, [2012] R.P.C. at 127 [84].
Id. at 128 [87].
Id. at 136–38 [129–40]. See generally EPC, supra note 4, art. 57.
See Eli Lilly, [2012] R.P.C. at 138 [140].
Id. at 132 [107].
Id. at 136–37 [130].
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reference to the patentee’s contribution to the art.216 The lower
courts took the view that what HGS had contributed was simply
not enough; there was nothing in the specification of genuine use
to the public, merely a protein sequence and some speculation on
what it might do based on publicly available knowledge.217 Again
they were overruled by the highest appellate court in the interests
of consistency with the EPO, which decided that the disclosure
from HGS, which had satisfied the EPO, was good enough here
too.218 This was a case, like Angiotech and Lundbeck before it,
where the House of Lords had clear scope to differ from the EPO
but declined that opportunity. The status of the EPO as de facto
final arbiter of the UK’s law of patents was now firmly entrenched.
VIII. THE RISKS OF ALIGNMENT WITH THE EPO
As the above review demonstrates, the House of Lords has
followed the EPO in every significant case since 1991 not because
the Lords necessarily agreed but because, faced with a choice, they
placed consistency above all else. Was this an abdication of the
court’s responsibility to interpret the law as they saw it?
Early on (in Asahi, Merrell Dow, Biogen, and Kirin Amgen) the
answer to this question is probably not. In these cases there was
every reason to agree with the EPO. Later on (in Lundbeck,
Angiotech, and HGS) there was good reason to think the EPO had
got it wrong. In HGS it was argued with some force that, being an
office rather than a court, the EPO’s case law had developed
primarily in ex parte cases, and was too generous to patentees.
The House of Lords rejected this argument, and accepted a
decisive shift of the balance in favour of the patentee without
challenge in the interests of maintaining uniformity. In principle,
the House of Lords (and now the Supreme Court) made judgments
only on questions of law, and its course has aligned UK law with
the law as it is developed and applied by the EPO. In practice,
however, the decisions of the EPO and the Courts are made in
specific factual contexts and it is unrealistic to attempt to divorce
216
217
218

Id. at 103 [H7].
Id. at 115 [31–34].
Id. at 134–35 [120].

C08_WATTSALKIN (DO NOT DELETE)

606

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

3/5/2013 11:35 AM

[Vol. 23:571

the legal question from its factual context. It is interesting to
speculate whether, if the first instance judge had applied the legal
test as eventually determined by the Supreme Court, he would also
have made findings of fact that meant the outcome was no
different. The legal tests leave room for judgment, as Lord
Neuberger expressly recognized in his judgment in HGS.
Adherence to the law determined by the EPO does not imply that
courts reach the same determination. While EPO decisions have
great persuasive authority on law, the same is not true in relation to
findings of fact.219 It is debatable whether the appellate system as
operated in the UK, in which decisions are not remitted for further
determination, guards sufficiently against the danger that following
legal determinations will drag in factual findings by the back door.
IX. THE UNIFIED PATENT COURT
The steps to complete the European patent package are
gathering pace. At the time of writing, the EU has put in place the
two regulations underpinning the Unitary Patent.220
The
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court was signed on 19 February
2013221 and the Rules of Procedure are in their fourteenth draft.222
219

See, e.g., Novartis AG v. Johnson & Johnson, [2011] E.C.C. 10, 191 [62] (“[The
TBA and other courts] did not have the benefit of the intensive probing of the facts and
expert evidence afforded by cross-examination which is provided by English procedure.
Sometimes that procedure is wasteful, but not in this case.”). A parallel can perhaps be
drawn with the decisions of the CJEU which constitutionally is not able to make findings
of fact. See Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed (No. 2), [2003] 1 C.M.L.R. 13, 388 [9],
393 [27], rev’d, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 25, 810 [25] (upholding the lower court on these
points).
220
Council Regulation 1257/2012, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of
the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, 2012 O.J. (L 361); Council Regulation
1260/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 361) (for the latter, with regard to the applicable translation
arrangements).
221
Bulgaria is expected to sign once internal procedues are completed. Spain and
Poland did not sign but the agreement remains open for signature. See Press Release,
Council of the European Union, Signing of the Unified Patent Court Agreement
(Feb. 19, 2013), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/
pressdata/en/intm/135593.pdf.
222
At the time of writing, the Preliminary set of provisions for the Rules of Procedure
of
the
Unified
Patent
Court,
fourteenth
draft,
is
available
at
http://www.upc.documents.eu.com/PDFs/2013-01-31_Rules_of_Procedure_Draft_14_
(15829021_1).pdf.
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There is still much to be done: the Agreement must be ratified by
thirteen Member States, the Rules finalised, fee levels set, judges
appointed and trained, local and regional divisions established, and
budgets, buildings and IT systems put in place. Consequential
changes are needed in the European Patent Convention, the
“Brussels” Regulation 44/2001 on civil jurisdiction and the SPC
Regulations 469/2009 and 1610/96. There is no doubt that that is a
substantial list, but there appears to be the political will to see it
through.
Under a Unified Patent Court, the relationship between the
Unified Court and the EPO may become analogous to the
relationship between a national courts and its national office. The
Court will have power under the Rules to supervise the
administrative tasks of the EPO in relation to unitary patents.223
Over time the Unified Court may also come to regard itself as the
senior forum for determining substantive questions of law and
validity. It might be argued that, in view of the recent history at
least in the UK, this is a welcome development. How long it takes
the new Court to develop the confidence to review and depart from
existing case law of the EPO remains to be seen.
A great deal of debate in the legislative history of the Unified
Patents Court focussed on the role of the Court of Justice of the
European Union. Practitioners were greatly concerned at the
effects on substantive patent law of the delays and inexperience in
patent matters that that would incur. Concern focussed in
particular of Articles 6–8 of the draft for Regulation 1257/2012,
and was largely assuaged when those Articles were replaced,
following a compromise meeting of legislators on 19 November
2012.224

223

See id., Rules 85–96.
See UK Parliament House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, 3 European
Unitary Patent, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/
cmselect/cmeuleg/86-xxi/86xxi06.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); European Parliament
Legislative Resolution of 11 December 2012 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the
Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, COM (2011) 0215 (Dec. 11, 2012),
available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st16/st16304.en12.pdf.
224
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Just as the EPO is open to accusations that, as a patent
awarding office, it develops the law in a direction that is unduly
friendly to patentees, one can anticipate that legal developments in
the new courts will be examined for policy influence. From the
Unified Patent Court, staffed with specialist patents judges, it
would be difficult to anticipate any particular policy direction
beyond the efficient operation of justice over the patents system.
The same would not have held true had the policy influence been
directed from the Court of Justice of the European Union. This is a
first important step towards establishing the credibility of the new
court.
It remains unclear when the effects of the new patent package
will really be felt. It is up to patentees225 to choose whether they
want a patent with unitary effect or to continue with the present
system. It is also up to patentees to choose whether to opt their
patents out of the system—an opt-out will be open for seven years
after the Agreement enters into force.226 Thus, even when the
system is up and running, it can only be expected to succeed if
patentees believe it will be an improvement over the existing
system.
It is difficult to overestimate the cynicism and even hostility
that greeted the proposals for the system, in the UK and elsewhere.
In one particularly scathing examination of the position, published
in May 2012, the UK parliament’s cross-party European Scrutiny
Committee concluded:
Although the theory of a unitary patent and unitary
patent court in Europe has long been thought
desirable, the practice has long been elusive. The
latest attempt appears, regrettably, to be a further
example of this. Moreover, some of the criticisms
raised by witnesses result from traits that are so
ingrained in the operation of the EU that a
legitimate question arises whether an effective
225

Council Regulation 1257/2012, recital 5.
Council Agreement on a Unified Patent Court 16351/12, art. 83, available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st16/st16351.en12.pdf (last visited Feb. 22,
2013).
226
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unitary patent can ever be achieved within the
confines of the EU’s internal legal order.
We conclude overall that the draft agreement on the
Unified Patent Court is likely to hinder, rather than
help, the enforcement of patents within the
European Union. This will particularly be so for
SMEs, the main intended beneficiaries. Given our
concerns, it is vital that the UK Government adopts
a strong position reflecting the concerns of
practitioners in final negotiations, as well as calling
for the Central Division to be in London in order to
mitigate the most damaging effects of a unitary EUwide patent.227
Now the proposals are reaching the point of reality, that
cynicism has been tempered on two accounts: by changes to the
proposals and by a coming to terms with a reality. This can be
seen in the paper produced from the European Scrutiny Committee
when it considered the position anew in February 2013. While
much of their concern has abated, they still conclude that questions
remained to be resolved:
8.27 We note the changes to the UPC Agreement
since we published our Report, The Unified Patent
Court: Help or Hindrance?, on 3 May last year.
The most significant change is the removal of the
ECJ’s jurisdiction over the infringement of unitary
patents, which was a principal recommendation of
our Report.228 We are also pleased to note that at
least part of the Central Division will be located in
London; that there is scope for extending the
transitional provisions by a further seven years; and
that Supplementary Protection Certificates will fall
within the UPC’s jurisdiction.

227

HOUSE OF COMMONS EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, THE UNIFIED PATENT
COURT: HELP OR HINDRANCE?, 2010–12, H.C. 1799-I, ¶ 186–87 (U.K.).
228
See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
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8.28 However, many of the concerns with the UPC
still remain, in particular the effect of bifurcation on
forum shopping, the training and quality of UPC
judges, the prohibitive expense of using the unitary
patent and UPC, particularly for SMEs, and the lack
of an up-to-date Commission impact assessment
(we remain doubtful at this stage of the benefits to
business suggested by the Minister in paragraph
8.24 above).
8.29 Given that the negotiations on the UPC
Agreement have now concluded, we are content to
clear it from scrutiny. The Minister says, however,
that:
“Further negotiations among the signatories will
also be necessary to finalise the rules of procedure
for the court, to set the level of patent and court fees
and establish the governance mechanisms for the
court. The Government will ensure that it continues
to influence the operational details related to the
Agreement and that the views of UK stakeholders
are considered in the wider discussions.
Separately, signatories will need to consider
whether to establish local or regional divisions of
the court.”[44]
8.30 In the light of this, we would be grateful if the
Minister would write to us at the conclusion of the
negotiations on the rules of procedure summarising
their content and explain to what extent they
mitigate the outstanding concerns we list above, and
to what extent they reflect the views of the
stakeholders which the Government will be
consulting.229
229

See UK Parliament House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, 8 European
Unitary Patent, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/
cmselect/cmeuleg/86-xxx/8610.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
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CHANGING PRACTICE—THE LAST TWENTY YEARS, AND THE
COMING DECADE
Looking back over the last twenty years, the development in
the law, and in particular the significance of the EPO, has been
paralleled by the internationalization of the role of the practitioner.
In the early 1990s, practice in the UK was emerging from a
period of introspection. We had been working over a decade or so
to address recognised deficiencies in a system that was thought to
be slow, expensive and overly rigid. By the early 1990s, our
patents courts had been through an overhaul. They brought cases
rapidly to trial, with experienced and respected judges, backed by a
broad and able profession in London. We had discovery confined
to reasonable proportions, and a flexible court procedure under the
parties’ control that gave real scrutiny to the issues, including those
under cross-examination. When we were preparing for trial, we
were focused on prior art, on discovery, on expert reports, and on
experiments, and then in trial we dealt with the issues through
cross-examining witnesses. That underpinning remains largely in
place to this day, and arguably provided a blueprint that heavily
influenced the broader overhaul of the UK civil justice system.
The UK system has not been heavily influenced by the
developments in e-discovery that have shaped procedural
developments in the United States, principally because discovery
in the UK has been so confined. It is no longer a trawl, but a much
more targeted and narrower exercise. Email, social media, the
incursion of private and social communications, and bring-yourown-device into the workplace create new challenges for
discovery. However, the extent to which discovery has been
confined in UK patents cases makes it likely that patent litigation
will be following developments in discovery-heavy actions in other
parts of civil justice rather than seeking to lead developments.
Back in the early 1990s, UK practitioners were already in
dialogue with our judges. This feature of the system has grown
and matured over the time. Currently two judges (Floyd and
Arnold JJ) hear most of the High Court cases at first instance with
one further judge (HHJ Birss) hearing cases in the Patents County
Court. Appellate cases are mostly heard in a panel that includes
Kitchin LJ, the former senior patents judge, and before that Jacob
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LJ took the same role. Lord Neuberger, well known for his interest
in patents cases, has taken over a leading role from Lord Hoffmann
in Supreme Court patent cases. The cadre of judges hearing most
of the cases is therefore small. They are without exception well
known to and well liked by the profession, which recognizes that
they have all gone a long way to make themselves available and to
listen to the views of practitioners on the development of practice
and on points of concern. This is not a new phenomenon. It was
the result of a movement given impetus by Mr. Justice Jacob when
he was first appointed and enthusiastically pursued by his
successors. The role of the late Sir Hugh Laddie and Sir Nicholas
Pumfrey in furthering the approachability of our judges should not
be overlooked or underestimated. As a result, over the last twenty
years it has increasingly been the case that practice develops
through a genuine dialogue between practitioners and the small
group of judges before whom we practice most often.
Twenty years ago, practitioners were beginning to take an
interest in the law in other parts of Europe. There were potential
tools in other jurisdictions that could be useful in particular
circumstances—the saisie contrafaçon in France (and Belgium)
being a prime example. Over the 1990s, we watched the
development of torpedoes in Italy (and Belgium) but, it is fair to
say, there was considerable doubt as to the wisdom of using those
tactics in the context of a UK action. It was well known that the
UK judges may assume that a party that was trying to keep a case
out of court had something to hide; that assumption would be
given strength by such nefarious and transparent tactics as the
torpedo actions. There are enough implements in the UK judicial
toolbox to address most matters of which the courts take a dim
view and, consequently, this jurisdictional contrivance was not
widely relied upon in UK cases. In general, while torpedoes were
in their heyday, UK professionals would advise clients on why
what looked like a great tactic in theory was in fact not such a good
idea in practice. Thankfully, the tactic was rarely used. When
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torpedo actions came to an end with Roche v. Primus230 and GAT
v. LuK,231 few mourned their passing.
While procedural games like the torpedo have not played a
huge part of UK practice, the same cannot be said about
substantive judgments. Most large patent cases that fight in the
UK are also being fought in at least The Netherlands, Germany and
perhaps France, Italy, the United States and elsewhere as well.
Twenty years back, co-ordination of these actions was primarily
(a) a matter of cost-saving by not duplicating work that had already
been done and (b) a way to avoid the difficulties that arise from a
witness being cross-examined against a backdrop of different
testimony before various courts. UK first instance judges used to
pay little interest to findings in parallel litigation in other
jurisdictions. One judge is famously rumoured to have opened the
folder “judgments of other jurisdictions” only after he had written
his judgment, and even then only to check that the overseas court
had come to the right decision. Mandated by the House of Lords
to defer to EPO decisions, and with the UK judges seeing more
and more of their European brethren at judges’ conferences and
elsewhere, the island mentality gradually eroded. Practitioners
started to read judgments from courts around Europe, to debate
comparative law, to use those cases in court as persuasive
authorities, and through this to promote the broader European
patent order.
While UK courts may initially have been reluctant to pay much
regard to foreign judgments, if anything the opposite is now true.
The clearest exposition of the position came in Grimme v. Derek
Scott232 where the Court of Appeal heard a case without being told
by either party that the same case had been the subject of a Dutch
judgment. Jacob LJ was unimpressed, saying:
Following oral argument we undertook some legal
research of our own and the opportunity of asking
judicial colleagues in Germany and Holland as to
whether they had any case law on the equivalent
230
231
232

Case C-539/03, Roche v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R. I-6535.
Case C-4/03, GAT v. LuK, 2006 E.C.R. I-6509.
Grimme Landmaschinenfabrik GmbH & Co. KG v. Scott, [2011] F.S.R. 7.
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provisions to s. 60(2). Indeed they had (and an
unreported case of Jacob J also emerged). The
Dutch Judge told us that his court had even
considered the case of a man selling Mr Scott’s very
machine. We were astonished that the parties,
particularly Grimme who were the Dutch plaintiffs,
did not tell us about that case.
Accordingly we sought further written argument on
the point.
Advocates should recognise that where a point of
patent law of general importance, such as the
construction of a provision which by Treaty (either
the EPC or the Community Patent Convention) is to
be implemented by states parties to those
conventions, has been decided by a court,
particularly a higher court, of another member state,
the decision matters here. For, despite the fact that
there is no common ultimate patent court for
Europe, it is of obvious importance to all the
countries of the European Patent Union or the
parties to the Community Patent Convention (“the
CPC”), that as far as possible the same legal rules
apply across all the countries where the provisions
of the Conventions have been implemented. An
important decision in one member state may well be
of strong persuasive value in all the others,
particularly where the judgment contains clear
reasoning on the point.
Broadly we think the principle in our courts—and
indeed that in the courts of other member states—
should be to try to follow the reasoning of an
important decision in another country. Only if the
court of one state is convinced that the reasoning of
a court in another member state is erroneous should
it depart from a point that has been authoritatively
decided there. Increasingly that has become the
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practice in a number of countries, particularly in the
important patent countries of France, Germany,
Holland and England and Wales. Nowadays we
refer to each other’s decisions with a frequency
which would have been hardly imaginable even
twenty years ago. And we do try to be consistent
where possible.
The Judges of the patent courts of the various
countries of Europe have thereby been able to create
some degree of uniformity even though the
European Commission and the politicians continue
to struggle on the long, long road which one day
will give Europe a common patent court.233
It can seem at times that this direction—that the reasoning of a
court in another member state is one the court should try to
follow—leads to appellate courts giving more deference to the first
instance (and even interlocutory) decisions of other member states
than they give to the UK first instance decision under appeal. It
also means that the basis of decisions is examined and reexamined, and the courts are increasingly alive to differentiated
arguments. What it has meant for practitioners is an everincreasing focus on the first decision in Europe, and thereafter on
playing out the same arguments and decision for confirmation by a
succession of other European courts. The consequence is that
practice genuinely has moved on to a European level. It is no
longer possible to run patent litigation in Europe wearing national
blinders. Strategic decisions have to be taken with an eye on how
it will be played out around Europe. Consistent argumentation is
no longer a luxury but a necessity.234
The race for consistency has consequences in practice. The
primary consequence has been an increasing pressure on
timetables. The knowledge that the first judgment will be the
guiding one could lead courts either towards speeding trials up so

233

Id. at 215 [77–81].
See, e.g., Novartis AG v. Johnson & Johnson Med. Ltd., [2011] E.C.C. 10, 190–91
[59–62].
234
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as to be the primary decision maker for Europe, or slowing cases
down so as to ease the process by having decisions to follow. The
UK court in general appears to favour the former camp, and
practice here over the last twenty years has been characterised by
trying to fit broadly the same amount of work into increasingly
tight timetables. That process has been assisted by the growth in
instantaneous communications and working practices; in fact the
only point of weakness in further acceleration appears to be the
capacity of individuals to work beyond the first twenty-four hours
of each day. At the same time, the last decade in particular has
seen a growing recognition that legal practice has to become more
diverse and accessible. The tensions are already growing between
case timetables predicated on twenty-four-hour availability of all
the lawyers involved on the one hand, and on the other new
entrants to the profession with ambitions to combine practice with
responsibilities and ambitions outside of their professional life.
The UK system has particular difficulties in this regard. The
very flexible UK procedure means that many features of procedure
can be the subject of judicial decisions and that in turn leads to
many interim applications on short notice. As European influence
grows, and particularly as the Unified Patents Court becomes a
reality, one can anticipate that interim applications are going to
become far less frequent and flexibility less available. While that
may sound like a disadvantage, it could considerably reduce costs,
encourage the planning that makes workloads more manageable
for those with responsibilities outside of work, and avoid obstacles
in bringing cases to trial on a planned pathway.
A second consequence of a race to consistency as been to
question over-engineered aspects of the existing systems. The UK
system is well equipped to handle large, complex cases but has for
years been poorly adapted to the problems of small and medium
sized enterprise (“SME”). The proposals go back at least as far as
the Committee chaired by Sir Derek Oulton in 1987, which led to
the establishment of the Patents County Court (PCC) in 1990. The
court had a shaky start and by 1999 was hearing very few cases. It
was re-launched in 2001 with the appointment of HH Judge Fysh
QC but concerns remained that there was little difference in
practice between Patents County Court and High Court procedures.
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Proposals for reform were published in July 2009 and adopted in
2010, which also saw the appointment of a new judge, HHJ Birss
QC. The PCC now limits evidence, discovery, trial time and cost
recovery, and is proving attractive to the SME audience for which
it was intended. And the result is perhaps more akin to practice
elsewhere in Europe. Twenty years ago, the advice practitioners
gave to SMEs about patent litigation tended to be not to bring it, or
(if advising a defendant) to find a way to give up as quickly as
possible. The Patents County Court has changed that. One can
anticipate that PCC business will continue to grow for the
foreseeable future. The change has great significance for the
profession. If volumes of PCC work continue to grow then the
normal practitioner workload may change from one or a handful of
giant cases to a large number of small cases—more in line with
practice elsewhere in Europe. As this is new work, it also could
generate significant extra demand for litigation services, for which
lawyers and patent attorneys are competing. Whether the
resources are sufficient to meet demand only time will tell. The
parallel operation of both a short and a full procedure in one
jurisdiction helps identify the strengths and weaknesses of each
and could, perhaps, provide useful information for the
development of the practice and procedure of the Unified Patents
Court—it is notable that the new court’s draft Rules set out, at the
outset, that “complex cases may require more time and procedural
steps and simple cases less time and less procedural steps.”235
Twenty years ago, practitioners in the UK had little
information about other cases. While UK courts were in principle
“open justice,” in practice interim applications were generally in
private, and the only information publicly available was the writ.
This has changed—a little. Judgments are now generally available
online quickly (usually through the excellent bailii.org site).
Almost every court hearing in patent cases is now open to the
public. More documents are in principle available from the court
file. But it is very far from perfect. Requests to the court office
for copies of pleadings are slow, expensive, time consuming and
235

See Preliminary set of provisions for the Rules of procedure of the Unified Patent
Court at 15 (Preamble), available at http://www.upc.documents.eu.com/PDFs/2013-0131_Rules_of_Procedure_Draft_14 _(15829021_1).pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).

C08_WATTSALKIN (DO NOT DELETE)

618

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

3/5/2013 11:35 AM

[Vol. 23:571

not always successful. Many documents are only available after
the considerable expense of an application and (brief) hearing.
Truly open justice is still some distance away.
Looking across the channel, UK practitioners appreciate that
even the modest openness achieved over the last twenty years
places the UK far ahead of the rest of Europe. Without openness,
it is difficult to make direct comparisons, hold parties to account
for their statements to courts, and ensure courts are able to hear the
full picture. But any smugness about the UK system is rapidly
dispelled on examining the U.S. approach. PACER—while it is
much derided in the United States—goes far beyond anything
available in the UK. It helps inform the U.S. system about its own
functionality and provides the ready means to hold witnesses and
parties to account. It is notable that it provides a primary source of
information for UK practitioners which our own systems cannot
provide. There are no plans to replicate PACER in the UK and no
realistic hope that over the next ten years we will see similar
openness here or indeed in any part of Europe. This is a pity,
because without the information that an open system breeds, one
cannot see the needs for reform that undoubtedly exist and that
would drive a better, more uniform and more functional European
system. When the Unified Patents Court comes into being it will,
from the outset, have on-line inspection facilities for pleadings,
evidence, decisions and orders.236 Perhaps that will encourage the
UK to catch up.

236

See Preliminary set of provisions for the Rules of procedure of the Unified Patent
Court at 109 (Rule 262), available at http://www.upc.documents.eu.com/PDFs/2013-0131_Rules_of_Procedure_Draft_14_(15829021_1).pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).

